Using Alternative Dispute Resolution to Streamline Superfund by Samson, Shana A.
Using Alternative Dispute Resolution to
Streamline Superfund
SHANA A. SAMSON
I. INTRODUCTION
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) commonly is used to strengthen
negotiations between conflicting parties. ADR is "a short-hand term for a set
of processes which assist parties in resolving their disputes quickly and
efficiently."' Objective third parties or neutral parties are pivotal to the
success of alternative dispute resolution.2 ADR recently has become a
necessary component of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency's (EPA's) enforcement program and should be considered for
potential use in all cases to streamline enforcement-related disputes. 3
The enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)4 in 1980 placed the
immense burden of implementing a program to identify and clean up
uncontrolled hazardous waste sites on the EPA and other Superfund
stakeholders.5 The EPA must create an effective method to investigate a vast
number of uncontrolled sites and the incredibly diverse range of problems.6
Certain aspects of the Superfund program have generated much criticism.
Specific complaints have focused on the pace and cost of cleanups, the
degree to which sites are cleaned, the fairness of the liability approach to
potentially responsible parties (PRPs),7 the role states play in the process,
I Office of Site Remediation Enforcement, U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Enforcement Actions, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 301, 301
(May 26, 1995) [hereinafter OSRE, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Enforcement Actions].
2 See id.
3 See Steven A. Herman, A Fundamentally Different Superfund Program, 12 NAT.
REsouRcEs & ENV'T 196, 197 (1998); see also OSRE, Use of Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Enforcement Actions, supra note 1, at 301.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995 & Supp. 1I 1997).
5 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, SuPERFuND ADMINISTRATIVE
IMPROVEMENTS/REFORMS 1 (1998).
6 See id.
7 There are four classes of PRPs explained in CERCLA's section 107, as follows:
(1) current owners and operators: parties who own or operate a vessel or facility; (2) past
owners or operators: parties who owned or operated the vessel or facility at the time of
disposal; (3) parties who arranged for the disposal or transport of hazardous substances;
and (4) transporters: parties who accepted hazardous substances for transport and who
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and the ability of local communities to have meaningful participation in the
process. 8 The cause of most of the controversy comes from CERCLA's
reliance on the "polluter pays" principle, "which assigns liability to actual
polluters in cleaning up the nation's hazardous waste sites while partly
funding cleanups with a Hazardous Substance Superfund." 9 Parties complain
that this approach causes the delays in cleanup, generates excessive
transaction costs, and forces parties to spend more time and money in
court. 10
The EPA is continually announcing administrative improvements to
quiet the criticisms of the Superfund program.1 However, many problems
are "beyond the scope of the EPA's statutory authority and have to be
considered by Congress in reauthorizing CERCLA.' '12
The goals of the EPA reforms can be put into the following two
categories: those designed to enhance enforcement fairness and reduce
transaction costs, and those designed to enhance cleanup effectiveness and
consistency. 13 This Note will focus on how the EPA is conducting several
efforts to create a fairer, less costly, and more efficient Superfund that the
EPA, parties, and the public can support.
Part II provides a general analysis of CERCLA as well as the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). This analysis outlines a
background understanding of how CERCLA works to clean up hazardous
waste sites throughout the United States and what opportunities for ADR
exist within the current version of CERCLA. Part III discusses the use of
ADR environmental actions and how they especially benefit Superfund. The
Superfund Reform Act of 1994 (SRA) will be examined in Part IV in order
to explain how Congress tried to use ADR theory to streamline Superfund.
Part V provides a detailed discussion of the EPA reforms based on the
Superfund Reform Act. This Part includes an analysis of how the EPA has
increased public involvement in Superfund and how the EPA has reformed
selected the site. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Any person who fits within the definition of
one of these four classes may be directly liable under CERCLA. See id.
8 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 5, at 1.
9 See Thomas A. Rhoads & Jason F. Shogren, Current Issues in Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization: How Is the Clinton Administration Handling
Hazardous Waste?, 8 DJKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 245, 245-46 (1998).
10 See id. at 246.
11 See id.
12 Id. Only small steps have been made by Congress in the reauthorization of
CERCLA. In 1994, the Superfund Reform Act (SRA) was introduced but did not pass.
The SRA will be discussed in greater detail below. See infra Part IV.
13 See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 5, at 4-5.
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enforcement in order to expedite settlement, reduce transaction costs, and
keep parties out of court.
11. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT
In the early development of environmental laws in the 1970s,
environmental regulators used a "command and control" method to control
pollution. 14 CERCLA and SARA echoed a new strategy where Congress
would use civil liability to regulate pollution.15 The civil liability approach is
meant to require responsible parties to pay for response costs at the
hazardous waste sites.
The CERCLA, commonly known as the Superfund law,16 was enacted
by Congress to address public health and welfare problems created by the
existence of thousands of abandoned hazardous waste landfills throughout
the United States. CERCLA was amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act1 7 (SARA) in 1986 to provide a variety of
improvements, including the encouragement of negotiated settlement.
CERCLA, as amended by SARA, includes many opportunities for ADR to
expedite settlement while reducing transaction costs.
CERCLA calls for the EPA to study and review all potential hazardous
waste sites, establish a National Priority List (NPL) of cleanup sites, and
develop a National Contingency Plan (NCP) creating a strategy for cleaning
up hazardous waste sites.18 Once a strategy is developed, the EPA must
conduct cleanups according to the NCP and the priority of the specific site on
the NPL.19
14 See Stephen Crable, ADR: A Solution for Environmental Disputes, 48 ARB. J. 24,
26 (1993). "Governmental regulators 'commanded' the level of allowable pollution in the
air and water and attempted to 'control' the pollution by regulations forbidding any
higher levels of pollution." Id.
15 See id.
16 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 §§ 101-175, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). CERCLA creates a fund, Superfund,
"which the Environment Protection Fund can access to finance the remediation of sites
that pose the highest risk." Herman, supra note 3, at 196.17 See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also Protection of
Environment, 40 C.F.R. 304.22 (1996) (requiring cleanup disputes to be submitted to an
arbitration panel).
18 See Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 300.210 (1996).
19 See id
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Parties found liable under CERCLA or SARA are liable without fault
because both CERCLA and SARA are strict liability statutes.20 This liability
is also both joint and several, and a party found to be only partially liable can
be forced to pay the entire cost of cleanup. 21 CERCLA and SARA are also
retroactive, thus covering any illegal activities that took place.22
Before the EPA begins an enforcement action at an uncontrolled
hazardous waste site, the EPA searches for and identifies potentially
responsible parties that may be liable under CERCLA for site cleanup. 23
A. Potentially Responsible Party Selection24
The EPA developed a structured procedure for identifying PRPs because
the PRPs for a site will often number in the hundreds. 25 Large PRP searches
require intensive gathering and organizing of documents associated with site
operations; therefore, contractors may conduct the PRP searches for the EPA
to cut down on costs and delay. 26 Information gathered by contractors is used
to identify PRPs and associate them with the type and volume of waste
contributed to the site.27 After the liability of PRPs at a site has been
established, the EPA, under its "Enforcement First" policy, seeks to reach a
settlement with the PRPs for the cleanup of the site. 28
20 See Leonard F. Charla & Gregory J. Parry, Mediation Services: Successes and
Failures of Site-Specific Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 89, 91
(1991). For an explanation of joint and several liability under CERCLA, see generally
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For further
explanation of the retroactivity of CERCLA, see generally Olin v. United States, 107
F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1996).
21 See Charla & Perry, supra note 20, at 91.
22 See id.
23 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 §§ 104(e), 107, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(e), 9607 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
24 See id. (discussing in greater detail the PRP search process). For further
discussion of the PRP search process, see generally OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE &
EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OSWER DIRECTIVE NO.
9834.03-2A, PRP SEARCH SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE FOR SITES IN THE SUPERFUND
REMEDIAL PROGRAM (1989) [hereinafter PRP SEARCH SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE].
25 See generally PRP SEARCH SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE, supra note 24.
26 See generally id.
27 See generally id.
28 See generally id. The "Enforcement First" policy was introduced in 1989. See
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
OSWER DIRECTIVE No. 9201.02A, MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF THE SUPERFUND
PROGRAM: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (1989); Crable, supra note 14, at 27-28; Herman,
supra note 3, at 196. In order to seek a settlement, the EPA must give the PRP 120 days
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B. Settlement Under CERCLA
Congress evidenced its desire to speed up cleanups and cost recovery
when provisions of SARA were enacted that described how liable .parties
could settle with the government.29 Whenever possible, the EPA will attempt
to reach a negotiated settlement with PRPs, through which the PRPs will
conduct or finance response actions. CERCLA provides the EPA with a
number of provisions to encourage settlements. 30
SARA's settlement provisions and the courts' imposition of joint and
several liability increase the incentive of PRPs to negotiate settlement
agreements.31 Other inducements to settle include escaping litigation costs,
having more control over cleanup and remedial actions, avoiding increased
costs caused by further deterioration at the site during delayed resolution of
the claim, and avoiding bad publicity.32
1. Settlement Terms
Pursuant to CERCLA section 113(f)(1), any liable party that believes it
has paid more than its fair share of response costs at a site, including a party
that participated in settlement agreements, may seek contribution from other
liable parties.33 Contribution suits help to mitigate the hardships that may be
imposed by joint and several liability on a party who contributes a small
amount of waste to a large environmental harm. In resolving contribution
claims, courts apply equitable factors34 that they deem appropriate.
Sections 113(f)(2) and 122(h)(4) of CERCLA confer contribution
protection on PRPs who resolve their liability to the United States in judicial
to pursue settlement before beginning any cleanup at the site. The purpose of the first 60
days is to give PRPs a chance to negotiate a cleanup plan and financing proposal among
themselves. The second 60 days is set aside for negotiation between the EPA and the
PRPs regarding the plan and execution of the plan. See Crable, supra note 14, at 28.
29 See H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 58-59 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2840-41.
30 See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 § 113(f)(l)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1)-(2) (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
31 See Peter F. Sexton, Comment, Superfund Settlements: The EPA's Role, 20 CoNN.
L. REv. 923, 941 (1988).
32 See id.
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).
34 Most allocations are based on the following factors: the volume, toxicity and
mobility of hazardous substances contributed by each party; the degree of care exercised
in handling the hazardous substance; and the degree of cooperation of the parties with
government officials in preventing further harm to public health or the environment.
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and administrative settlements, respectively. 35 The settling PRPs are
protected from contribution claims by nonsettling PRPs and others, for
matters addressed in the settlement.36 These provisions serve as an incentive
to settlement.
Under CERCLA § 122(f), settlements concerning releases addressed by a
remedial action may contain a covenant not to sue the settling PRP in order
to encourage settlement.37 Covenants not to sue are used when any of the
following circumstances arise: the covenant not to sue is in the public
interest, the covenant not to sue will expedite the response action, the settler
is in compliance with the consent decree, or the response action has been
approved by the EPA.38
2. Settlement Tools
Under CERCLA § 122, there are a variety of settlement tools available to
the EPA including mixed funding, nonbinding allocation of responsibility
(NBAR), and de minimis settlements used to encourage and expedite
settlement.39
According to CERCLA § 122(b)(1), at any multiparty site, the EPA may
be in a situation in which some PRPs are willing to settle and other PRPs are
unwilling or unable to settle.40 The settling PRPs sometimes seek the EPA's
payment of a portion of the costs through the use of Superfund. These are
known as "mixed funding settlements." 41
Section 122(b)(1) gives the EPA authority to enter into mixed funding
settlements. The EPA uses the following factors in evaluating mixed funding
settlements: (1) the strength of the liability case against both settlers and
nonsettlers; (2) the options left to the government if a settlement is not
reached; (3) the size of the share to be covered by Superfund; and (4) the
good faith of the settlers.42
There are three types of mixed funding settlements.43 The first is a
"preauthorization" in which the settling PRPs agree to conduct response
35 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(f)(1), 9622(h)(4).
36 See id.
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f).
38 See id.
39 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622.
40 See id. § 9622(b)(1).
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 See Superfund Program; Mixed Funding Settlements, 53 Fed. Reg. 8279, 8279-80
(1988).
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activities, the EPA agrees to finance a portion of the costs through
reimbursement of settlers, and this is followed by an attempt to recover those
costs from nonsettlers.44 Second, there are "cash-out" agreements where the
settling PRPs pay the EPA a portion of the response costs that the EPA uses
to perform the response action.45 Finally, the EPA can used "mixed work" in
which the EPA and the settling PRPs each agree to conduct certain activities
during the response action.46
Mixed funding settlements represent one portion of a comprehensive
effort to facilitate settlements of enforcement actions under CERCLA.47
Settlement agreements incorporating mixed funding provisions, as described
in part under section 122(b) of CERCLA, offer an alternative either to
immediate Superfund financing of the total costs of response actions at a site
or possible delays in cleanup resulting from litigation required, to force PRP
action.48
Under CERCLA § 122(e)(3), the EPA may issue a nonbinding allocation
of 100% of the responsibility if it will promote a settlement and thus reduce
transaction costs.49 NBARs are especially appropriate in certain situations. In
cases that involve federal agencies, states, or municipalities as PRPs, an
NBAR may be helpful in promoting settlement. 50 Additionally, in cases with
a large number and variety of PRPs and de minimis parties, an NBAR may
encourage settlement by creating a steering committee to represent
adequately the diverse interests at the site.51
NBARs are not always successful in promoting settlement because there
are a variety of situations where NBARs are not feasible.52 An NBAR will
not encourage settlement if "there is insufficient information available on
which to base an NBAR," and "[l~n some cases it may seem that an equitable
settlement can be more expeditiously or effectively achieved without the use
44 Id. at 8280.
45 Id.
46 Id
4 7 See id.
48 See id.; see also Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 § 122(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b) (1994 & Supp. 1I 1997).
49 See Superfund Program; Non-Binding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility,
52 Fed. Reg. 19,919, 19,919 (1987).
50 See id. at 19,920.
51 See id.; see also infra note 68 and accompanying text for further explanation of de
minimis settlements.
52 See Superfund Program; Non-Binding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility
(NBAR), 52 Fed. Reg. at 19,919.
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of NBAR procedures. '53 NBAR procedures are not an option if PRPs at the
site are preparing for an allocation at the site.54
The allocation under an NBAR may be affected by the following factors:
volume, toxicity, and mobility of hazardous substances; strength of the cases
against individual PRPs; and PRP viability.55 An NBAR is preliminary, and
PRPs are free to adjust the percentages allocated by the EPA among
themselves. 56
At multiparty sites, some PRPs may have disposed of relatively small
quantities of hazardous substances, or a landowner may not have been aware
of or involved with hazardous substance activities at the facility.57 In the
interest of reaching a final settlement with such parties as promptly as
possible, CERCLA authorizes special settlements with these de minimis
parties.58 Under CERCLA § 122(g), a de minimis settlement may be
appropriate in the following two situations: (1) where the amount of toxicity
of hazardous substances contributed by a party is minimal compared with the
total amount of toxicity of hazardous substances at the site; or (2) where a
party is a property owner who did not conduct or permit the generation,
handling, or disposal of hazardous substances at the facility, did not
contribute to the release or threatened release at the facility, and acquired the
facility without knowledge that the property had been used to store, handle,
or dispose of hazardous substances. 59
PRPs and the EPA both benefit from section 122(g) de minimis
contributor settlements. 60 De minimis settlements are "an effective means of
achieving an early and equitable resolution of their liability with the
expenditure of reduced legal fees and other transaction costs. '61 Section
122(g) gives the EPA a method to eliminate from litigation and negotiation
the PRPs that have contributed only minimal amounts of waste to the site,
53 Id.
54 See id.
55 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 § 122(e)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(e)(3) (1994 & Supp. M 1997).
56 See Superfund Program; Non-Binding Preliminary Allocations of Responsibility
(NBAR), 52 Fed. Reg. at 19,919. "An NBAR is not binding on the government or the
PRPs; it cannot be admitted as evidence or reviewed in any judicial proceeding, including
citizen suits." Id.
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A)-(B).
58 See id.; see also Superfund Program; De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52
Fed. Reg. 24,333, 24,333-34 (1987).
59 See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A)-(B).
60 See Superfund Program; De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg. at
24,334.
61 Id.
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thereby streamlining enforcement.62 De minimis settlements also offer "the
potential for increased numbers of voluntary settlement agreements. This is
because de minimis contributors may be attracted by the advantages offered
by Section 122(g) settlements, and non-de minimis parties may be
encouraged to settle as a result of the revenues raised through such
agreements." 63
Mixed funding, NBARs, and de minimis settlements provide PRPs with
the opportunity to reduce transaction costs, speed up the settlement process,
and decrease litigation costs and delays. These settlement tools give the EPA
and PRPs a chance to work together in a nonadversarial situation to
determine cost allocation at a Superfund site. By working together to settle
cases, the relationships between the EPA and parties will grow less
antagonistic, thus making settlement and compliance easier in the future.
Ill. USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DIsPuTES
The EPA utilizes five different ADR methods, as follows: mediation,
convening, allocation, arbitration, and fact-finding. 64 Mediation is the
primary ADR tool used by the EPA because it "promotes innovative
solutions, cooperation among the parties and responsibility for the result by
all parties."65 In mediation a neutral third party without any authority to
make decisions promotes a "voluntary negotiated settlement" between
62 See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A)-(B).
63 Superfund Program; De Minimis Contributor Settlements, 52 Fed. Reg. at 24,334.
The advantages to a de minimis party that settles early is contribution protection under
CERCLA § 122(g)(5) and a covenant not to sue where such a covenant is consistent with
the public interest under CERCLA § 122(g)(2). See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(2),
(5).
64 See OSRE, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Enforcement Actions, supra
note 1, at 301.
65 U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Alternative Dispute Resolution (visited Feb. 16,
2000) <http://www.epa.gov/regionOl/steward/adr/index.html>.
EPA Region I, New England has become a national leader in promoting the use
of ADR to prevent and/or resolve environmental disputes in an effective, cost-
efficient manner. [The EPA is currently employing] ADR in three general contexts:
(1) settling enforcement cases; (2) promoting community... participation in
consensus-based environmental decision-making; and, [sic] (3) preventing
escalating conflicts by including ADR mechanisms in the dispute resolution
provisions of settlement agreements.
Id.
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disputants. 66 The second method is "convening," in which the EPA uses a
third party neutral to organize disputants for negotiations and assists them in
deciding whether to take advantage of ADR and in the selection of an
appropriate ADR professional. 67 The EPA also uses third party neutrals to
assist the parties in determining their share of responsibility at a Superfund
site in a process called "allocation." 68 The EPA also uses arbitration, a more
court-like decisionmaking process in which a third party hears the dispute
and renders either a binding or nonbinding decision.69 Finally, in fact-finding
a third party specialized in technical disputes studies the findings at a site to
aid settlement.70
ADR is appropriate for many EPA enforcement actions. When there are
present or foreseeable obstacles to negotiation that will require great lengths
of time or high costs in order to reach settlement there is an indication that
ADR will help facilitate settlement at the site.71 In most cases ADR will be
successful if there are no precedent-setting issues involved and there is
enough case information to substantiate violations.72 According to the EPA's
ADR liaison, Dave Batson, there are situations in which ADR may not be
appropriate. 73 For example, "if parties are unwilling to negotiate," "if parties
are not ready or refuse to negotiate," "if time constraints prevent successful
efforts," or "if leaders and decision-makers are not included," ADR is likely
to fail.74 It is important to consider all of these scenarios before using ADR
to avoid wasting time and money in unsuccessful negotiations.
66 See Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Protection
Agency, Alternative Dispute Resolution Fact Sheet (visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://lles.
epa.gov/oeca/osre/950500-2.html>.
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 See id. In the case of arbitration, "a third party hears the dispute and renders a
decision.... EPA may enter into binding arbitration for cost recovery claims below
$500,000 under CERCLA 122(h)(2), 42 U.S.C. 9622(h)(2)." Id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See generally Dave Batson, ADR-Alternative Dispute Resolution (visited Feb.
16, 1999) <http//es.epa.gov/oeca/neti/update/adrolin.html>.
74 Id. According to Richard H. Mays, there are other situations where ADR is not
helpful. For instance, in some cases "the conduct one of the parties is so egregious as to
make it in the public interest to subject that party to the most visible trial and punishment
available." Richard H. Mays, ADR and Environmental Enforcement: Myths,
Misconceptions, and Fallacies, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099, 10,100 (Mar.
1989) [hereinafter Mays, Myths, Misconceptions, and Fallacies] (citing Richard H. Mays,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Environmental Enforcement: A Noble Experiment or
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The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act75 in 1990 strengthened EPA
policy by encouraging the use of ADR in all federal- disputes. Also, the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 199076 authorized district court judges to require
parties to attempt mediation prior to litigation.77 A companion to these Acts,
the Executive Order on Civil Justice Reform, promotes settlement and offers
the use of ADR as appropriate to improve access to justice for all persons.78
The EPA has used ADR in negotiations arising under Superfund,79 the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,80 the Emergency
Planning and Right to Know Act of 1986,81 the Clean Air Act,82 the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA),83 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act,84 and the Toxic Substances Control Act.85 Mediated
negotiations have ranged from two party FWCPA cases to Superfund
disputes involving upwards of 1200 parties.86
Alternative Dispute Resolution works especially well in the Superfund
arena for a variety of reasons. First, CERCLA's strict liability and joint and
several liability standards provide disincentives to litigate because there is
little hope of escaping liability.87 ADR is also quite helpful because
"complex cases benefit from a third-party" neutral. 88 Superfund cases inhibit
the sharing of information because joint and several liability often keeps
a Lost Cause?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099, 10,099 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter
Mays, A Noble Experiment or a Lost Cause?]).
75 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-583 (1994), amended by Administrative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-584 (Supp. IV 1998). While the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act does not mandate the use of ADR, it does encourage federal agencies to
consider using ADR methods prior to initiating litigation. See id. § 573(c). The Act does
this expressly by granting authority and providing for the training of bureaucrats in
dispute resolution techniques. See id. §§ 572(a), 573.
76 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1994 & Supp. 1 1996).
77 See id. § 473(a)(6).
7 8 See Exec. Order No. 12,988, 3. C.F.R. 157, 157 (1997).
7 9 See generally Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. 1'1 1997).
8 0 Id. §§ 6901 et seq. (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
81 Id. §§ 11,011-11,050 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
8 2 Id. §§ 7401-7671 (1994 & Supp. 1111997).
83 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
84 7 U.S.C. §§ 121 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
85 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
86 See OSRE, Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Enforcement Actions, supra
note 1, at 301.
87 See Sandra M. Rennie, Kindling the Environmental ADR Flame: Use of
Mediation and Arbitration in Federal Planning, Permitting, and Enforcement, 19 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envt. L. Inst.) 10,479, 10, 480 (Nov. 1989).88 Id.
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parties at odds, and third party neutrals help to facilitate the sharing of
information without the threat total liability.89 Another important reason for
the success of ADR in Superfund enforcement is that technical and scientific
questions are answered more easily by a neutral with experience in
environmental issues.90 The general success of ADR results from the
neutral's capability to mold ADR methods to fit the complex issues that are
inherent to Superfund sites.
If ADR is used at Superfund sites, parties can reach more rapid
conclusions to disputes and spend less money on transaction costs like court
and attorney fees.91 Additionally, implementing ADR in enforcement
negotiations benefits society by reducing the total burden on the court
system.92 One of the greatest benefits is "having tribunals or panels of
experts within the parties' field make the decision on problems occurring in
that field .... -"93 This helps to ensure that the resolution will be tailored to
promote the interests of all parties.94
ADR is not a universal bandage to the tremendous amount of problems
regarding environmental disputes; there are some disadvantages as well.
There may be added costs, delays,, and overstructured results caused by
misapplication of techniques to disputes or problems not calling for those
methods or techniques. 95 Therefore, ADR must be used carefully by experts
in order to draw positive results.
The remainder of this Note will focus on the benefits of ADR to
environmental enforcement in the Superfund arena. ADR is especially useful
to Superfund because "CERCLA's strict liability and joint and several
standards leave little opportunity to escape from liability and increase the
anxiety associated with losing since the EPA typically sues only a portion of
the PRPs at a site."'96 Complex cases, like those at Superfund sites, benefit
from a third party neutral because "joint and several liability of the parties
inherently inhibits open sharing of the information often necessary to
agreement. '97 In addition, in Superfund cases there are usually present or
foreseeable obstacles to negotiation which require time or resources to get
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See Charla & Parry, supra note 20, at 90.
92 See id.
93 Id.
94 See id.
95 See id.
96 Rennie, supra note 87, at 10,480.
97 Id.
[Vol. 15:2 2000]
USING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION TO STREAMLINE SUPERFUND
through in order to reach settlement. ADR can help to reduce these costs and
overcome obstacles.more efficiently than litigation.
ADR is beneficial to many sites where groups of PRPs work together in
generator committees or steering committees to discuss and resolve problems
they are facing. 98 "Allocation of liability for individual PRPs is a paramount
issue for these committees. It is in this allocation process that ADR has the
greatest potential." 99 The steering committee uses a "negotiation-type
mechanism" that "minimizes courtroom time in the cases culminating in
consent decrees."1 00 In order to be most successful with the application of
ADR techniques, they must be applied "on a case-by-case basis, since fact
situations differ from site to site .... 101
In summary, ADR advantages the EPA in many ways. ADR can reduce
transaction costs, identify all responsible parties at a site, provide relatively
equitable allocation, reduce friction among the parties, enhance credibility of
the steering committee, and expedite remediation. 102
Unfortunately, neither the EPA nor the private sector has accepted ADR
with open arms. Impediments on both the government and the private side
ultimately are based on the lack of understanding or training in ADR. 10 3 In
fact, "the general misunderstanding of ADR and its various procedures has
been a greater impediment to the use of ADR" than any valid legal or public
policy objection. ' 104 This obstacle has lost its strength in recent years as
ADR gains support throughout the legal and administrative field.
But, one must always remember, if ADR techniques are applied
"inappropriately," costs may increase, trust among the parties may be lost,
and controversy likely will arise, thereby causing delayed remediation. 105
Therefore, "ADR techniques need to be applied carefully and selectively [by
trained professionals in order] to optimize beneficial outcomes and minimize
negatives."1 06
9 8 See Charla & Parry, supra note 20, at 92. "A steering committee is simply a group
of PRPs who voluntarily band together to deal with and resolve issues of common
concern arising out of the site." Id.
99 Id. Allocation will be discussed in greater detail infra in Part V.B.3.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 93.
102 See id.
103 See Mays, A Noble Experiment or a Lost Cause, supra note 74, at 10,090.
104 See Mays, Myths, Misconceptions, and Fallacies, supra note 74, at 10,102.
105 Charla & Parry, supra note 20, at 93-94.
10 6 Id. at 94.
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IV. SUPERFUND REFORM ACT OF 1994107
During the 103d Congress, a new outlook for CERCLA was proposed in
the Superfund Reform Act of 1994 (sometimes referred to herein as "the
Act"). The SRA was an attempt to increase efficiency in the enforcement of
CERCLA. It developed important strategies to promote community
participation and the protection of human health. 108 The SRA also
established a liability allocation procedure "with the hope of encouraging
settlements and reducing transaction costs." 10 9 These new approaches were
designed to streamline the Superfund process and to allow responsible parties
to settle for their "share" of liability. 10
A. Community Participation
Congress outlined the new policy of community participation in section
101 of the SRA. There were grants set aside for technical assistance 11 and
provisions to improve citizen and community participation in the Superfund
decisionmaking process. 112 The SRA set up "community working groups" to
provide information relating to "facility remediation, including health
studies, potential remedial alternatives, and selection and implementation of
remedial and removal actions."1 13 These provisions were established to
promote citizen cooperation in the Superfund decisionmaking process. By
involving citizens in the Superfund process, Congress expressed a desire to
increase public awareness of the health and environmental threats at
Superfund sites and ultimately to gain much needed public support.
107 H.R. 3800, 103d Cong. (1994). The Superfund Reform Act of 1994 also was
introduced in the Senate as S. 1834, 103d Cong. (1994).
108 See H.R. 3800 §§ 101-112.
109 David L. Markell, "Reinventing Government": A Conceptual Framework for
Evaluating the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of 1994's Approach to Intergovernmental
Relations, 24 ENVTL. L. 1055, 1070 (1994). The SRA gives the EPA authority to manage
the allocation of costs among PRPs. See id. The process has six simple steps, as follows:
(1) the EPA finds the PRPs responsible at the site; (2) a "neutral allocator" is designated;
(3) an allocation process is conducted in which parties either can represent themselves
orally or in writing; (4) a draft report is issued by the allocator creating nonbinding
equitable allocations of costs of the PRPs; (5) the parties can comment on the report; and
(6) a final report is issued reporting shares of responsibility. See id.
110 See H.R. 3800 §§ 101-112.
111 See id. § 101(e).
112 See id. § 101(f).
113 Id. § 102(g)(2).
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B. Allocation Procedures
Congress presented the new policy of allocation in section 409 of the
SRA.114 The SRA began by examining the scope of the allocation procedures
at multi-party facilities. 115 It laid out a detailed description of the
commencement of allocation, including procedures for the responsible party
search, the notification of de minimis parties, and the preliminary notice to
other parties. 116
Congress explained a new procedure for cost allocation at Superfund
sites. 117 According to the Act, following the issuance of the final list of
allocation parties, an allocator "shall initiate and conduct an allocation
process that shall culminate in the issuance of a written report, with a non-
binding, equitable allocation of the percentage shares of responsibility of all
allocation parties... for the facility, and provide such report to the allocation
parties and the Administrator."" 18
The allocation of percentage shares for the facility should be based on
the following factors: (1) the "amount of hazardous substances contributed
by each ... party"; (2) the "degree of toxicity of hazardous substances
contributed by each ... party"; (3) the "mobility of hazardous substances
contributed by each... party"; (4) the "degree of involvement of
each... party in generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal";
(5) the "degree of care exercised by each... party"; (6) the "cooperation of
each... party in contributing to the response action and in providing timely
information during the allocation process"; and (7) any other facts that the
EPA Administrator thinks are necessary and consistent with published EPA
guidelines. 119
The Act also discussed the- other important factors of the allocation
process. There was an explanation of how parties should respond to the
allocator's information requests, 120 the civil and criminal penalties under the
Act, 121 and the confidentiality of all documents and materials submitted to
the allocator.122
114 H.R. 4916, 103d Cong. § 409 (1994).
115 See id. § 130(a)(1)-(7).
116 See id. § 130(c)(1)-(6).
117 See id. § 130(g), (h).
118 IcL § 130(h)(1).
119 Id. § 130(h)(2)(A)-(G).
120 See id. § 130(i).
121 See id. § 130(j).
122 See id. § 130(k).
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Neither PRPs nor the United States would have been bound by the
allocation report. 123 Under the SRA, however, the United States would have
been required to accept a timely offer of settlement from a party based on its
allocated percentage share, if the offer included "appropriate premia and
other terms and conditions of settlement" and if the EPA and the DOJ did not
determine that "a settlement based on the allocator's determinations would
not [have been] fair, reasonable, and in the public interest."12 4 If the EPA and
the DOJ were to reject the allocation, the determination would not have been
judicially reviewable.1 25
V. EPA REFORMS BASED ON THE SUPERFUND REFORM ACT OF 1994
The EPA reform initiatives to increase public participation and
streamline Superfund discussed in this Part are patterned after concepts from
proposals introduced during the 103d Congress.126 The pilot programs
initiated by the EPA stress enforcement, economic redevelopment, public
outreach in decisionmaking, environmental justice, 127 and state and tribal
empowerment. 128 The response from interested parties to the intent of the
initiatives was generally positive.' 29
123 See generally S. 1068-1070, 103d Cong. (1994).
124 See generally id.
125 See generally id.
126 See Superfund: Regional Officials Asked to Evaluate EPA's Proposed
Administrative Initiative, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2034, 2034-36 (Feb. 24, 1995)
[hereinafter Regional Officials Asked to Evaluate EPA's Proposed Administrative
Initiatives]. The SRA received broad support but it failed to pass. See id.
127 On February 11, 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,898, entitled
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations, as well as an accompanying Presidential Memorandum, to focus
federal attention on the environmental and human health conditions in minority and low-
income communites. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859, 859-61 (1995); see also
William J. Clinton, Memorandum on Environmental Justice (Feb. 11, 1994), in 1 PUB.
PAPERS 241, 241-42. The strategy to ameliorate this problem identifies and addresses
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of any federal
agency's programs, policies, and activities on minority and low-income populations. See
Clinton, supra, at 241.
128 See Regional Officials Asked to Evaluate EPA's Proposed Administrative
Initiatives, supra note 126, at 2034.
129 See id. The first course was held in June 1993, the second in February 1995, and
the third in October 1995. The reforms focused on the following areas: clean ups,
enforcement, risk assessment, public participation and environmental justice, economic
redevelopment, innovative technology, and state and tribal empowerment. See 1998
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY
ANN. REP. 1-4.
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A. Reforms to Increase Public Involvement
The EPA has created a program that implements innovative ADR
techniques to reform the Superfund program to reduce litigation, limit
attorney's fees, and increase community participation in the toxic waste
cleanup process. If successful, these refoi-ns will streamline Superfund to a
point where little contention exists between the EPA, the parties, and the
public.
1. Pilot Community-Based Remedy Selection and Community
Advisory Groups
Pilot Community-Based Remedy Selection "is based on the theory that
consensus-based approaches to remedy selection, and collaborative
partnerships involving community stakeholders, can lead to remedies that
better satisfy the community, while still meeting statutory and regulatory
requirements." 130 The EPA hopes this initiative will further the development
of community participation. 131
In order to motivate communities to become part of the clean-up process,
the EPA developed community advisory groups (CAGs). 132 CAG
participants represent diverse interests and provide "a public forum to
consider cleanup-related issues and to work with EPA to address community
needs and concerns with respect to the response."'133 The EPA wants to
develop a close relationship with the CAG in the hope that the community
will affect the site cleanup settlements positively. 134
There has been overall success to date regarding the Remedy Selection
program. Assistance from the residents in the settlement at the Lower East
Fork Poplar Creek Site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee "resulted in estimated future
cost reductions (cleanup savings) of $160 million. '135 From the Manhattan
project of World War II through the Cold War era, large volumes of mercury
were released continuously into a creek from the production of nuclear
130 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 50.
131 See id.
132 See id. CAGs are an outgrowth of the Community Working Groups (CWGs)
proposed in § 103 of the Superfund Reform Act. See S. 1060-1061, 103d Cong. § 103
(1994). There Congress created CWGs to serve as an information clearinghouse for the
community and as an advisory group to the EPA, particularly for the purpose of
determining the reasonably anticipated future use of land at the facility. See id.
133 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTON AGENCY ANN. REP. 50.
134 See id.
135 See id.
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weapons at the Oak Ridge facilities. 136 The EPA, the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE), and the Tennessee Department of Environment and
Conservation included the public by providing presentations to community
groups in Oak Ridge and surrounding communities. 137 While creating a
workplan for the Site, DOE accepted comments from a citizen working
group, and this group's pressure managed to raise the cleanup goal from 180
parts per million (ppm) to the 400ppm level.138 "The change in the cleanup
goal to conform to public opinion reflects the community's voice in the
remedy selection process and the government's responsiveness to citizen
participation."'139 Community involvement has been an important settlement
factor at other sites including Jasper County, Missouri 140 and Leadville,
Colorado.141 Although the circumstances and methods varied at each of these
sites, the outcomes were enhanced because the public felt included. 142
Comments from CAG participants, EPA staff, and state and local
government staff involved in cleanup actions have stressed the incredible
success of CAGs. 143 For example, at the Allied Paper, Inc. Site in Portage
Creek, Michigan, state officials and citizens worked together in a CAG to
ease public involvement by keeping citizens aware of progress at the Site. 144
136 See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Region 4: Elements of Success at Lower East
Fork Poplar Creek Site, Regional Success Stories (visited Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.
epa.gov/swerffrr/reg-suc.htm>.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 Id.
14 0 See 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 50. In Jasper County, Missouri, at the Oronogo-
Duenweg Site, because of a partnership between the CAG and the remedial project
manager, a grant was given to the community in order "to develop an environmental
master plan which served as the basis for the institutional controls adopted as part of the
site remedy." Id.
141 See id. In Leadville, Colorado, at the California Gulch Site, the EPA calmed
angry citizens by taking time to listen to the community and to create "mutually
acceptable solutions." Id.
142 See id.
143 See id. at 70.
144 See id. There are several similar CAG success stories. See generally id.
According to the EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response's Annual Report
for 1998, "the CAG concept has been so successful that other Agency programs
(Community-Based Environmental Protection, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, and Project XL) adopted its ideas in fiscal year 1998." 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE
& EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 22. In addition,
the EPA has distributed a CAG toolkit to guide communities in creating a CAG. See id.
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After analyzing various case studies, the EPA collaborated the following
advice and concerns, important to communities that may form a CAG: (1)
"CAGs should be formed as early as possible"; (2) "[t]he community must
take the initiative in CAG formation and operation"; (3) "CAGs must be
inclusive and independent"; (4) "[a]ccess to good technical expertise is
important"; (5) "[tlhe CAG must recognize what is possible and work within
those limits"; (6) "CAG leaders must be 'in it' for the long haul"; (7) "CAGs
are more effective than public meetings"; (8) "[t]he need for additional
resources is a common concern"; (9) "CAGs can give the community more
influence in site-related decisions"; and, (10) "CAGs can speed up the
process." 145
The Pilot Community-Based Remedy Selection and Community
Advisory Groups are good examples of how using innovative ADR
techniques that involve the community in the settlement process can help to
increase awareness among Superfund response personnel of their
responsibility to work with citizens affected by the cleanup and the
importance of including community values and concerns in response
decisionmaking.
2. Community Involvement in the Enforcement Process
In order to strengthen the Superfund reforms effort, actions have been
taken to include communities in the enforcement process. Pilot sites were
developed where the community took an active role in creating workplans
and frequently received information about progress at the site.146 These pilots
have helped the EPA to understand that "communities who regularly attend
technical meetings are more informed and, therefore, better able to
understand the progress of response activities" and that "a greater degree of
community involvement may result in time and resource savings in the long
run. 147
145 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 70.
146 See id. at 73.
147 Id.
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3. Superfund Ombudsperson in Every Region148
The ombudsperson in every region provides the public with a local
representative who is familiar with the situation at the site and who is capable
of facilitating stakeholder concerns. 149 An ombudsperson is "an official,
appointed by an institution, whose job is to investigate complaints and either
prevent disputes or facilitate their resolution within that institution."1 50 The
Superfund Regional Ombudsperson (RO) is responsible for "resolving
concerns and providing information and guidance" and can assist "staff
members to settle or prevent problems with stakeholders."'151 The ROs have
been able to provide quick answers to health-related questions from
concerned citizens by responding directly to stakeholders when possible.152
The Superfund Regional Ombudsperson has been a unanimous success
throughout the regions. For example, the RO at the Rayioner Pulp Mill in
Port Angeles, Washington eased the community by providing information to
the stakeholders about the closure of the mill and landfill sites used to
dispose of mill wastes.1 53 A site team with a community involvement
coordinator now works closely with interested parties in order to maintain a
positive outcome at the site.154
The Superfund Regional Ombudsperson has helped to increase the
overall rating with stakeholders and make the Superfund program more
responsive to the community.
148 Thq U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is divided into 10 regional offices, as
follows: Region I, in Boston, Massachusetts; Region II, in New York, New York; Region
I, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Region IV, in Atlanta, Georgia; Region V, in Chicago,
Illinois; Region VI, in Dallas, Texas; Region VII, in Kansas City, Kansas; Region VIII,
in Denver, Colorado, Region IX, in San Francisco, California; and Region X, in Seattle,
Washington. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Regions (visited Feb. 26, 2000)
<http://www.epa.gov/epahome/ locate2.htm>.
149 See 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENvTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 51.
1 5 0 LEONARD L. RISKIN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 4 (1987).
151 See 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 51.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 51-52.
154 See id. at 52. The success of ROs has been legion. See id.
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B. Enforcement Reforms
1. Potentially Responsible Party Search Pilots
The primary goals of the PRP search pilots are to improve the quality
and timeliness of searches for potentially responsible parties and make
information more accessible. 155 The EPA also planned to identify and offer
small parties expedited settlements prior to the selection of the remedy at
pilot sites in order to remove the small contributors or de minimis156parties
from Superfund enforcement activities much earlier than with the traditional
process.157
In 1995, sites were identified in order to analyze whether the SRA could
be accomplished by using early PRP searches and one or more streamlining
techniques. 158 The pilot sites were created to meet "a time frame that would
lead to notification of potential de minimis parties within twelve months after
the search start and notification of all other parties within eighteen months
after the search start."159
After analyzing the pilot program, the EPA found the streamlining
techniques favorable to the improvement of PRP searches on the whole. For
example, the model information request letter helped to identify "150
additional parties early in the search process."'160 In addition, early interviews
helped solicit important details about other parties and provided a clear
picture of the history of the site.161 Also, a publicly available repository for
PRP search information provided PRPs and local community groups with
155 See Superfund: Hundreds of Small Parties Released from Enforcement Under
Agency Reforms, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2196, 2196-97 (Mar. 22, 1996) [hereinafter
Hundreds of Small Parties Released from Enforcement].
156 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980 § 122(g)(1)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(A)-(B) (1994); see also infra Part
III.B.2 for a discussion of settlement tools for use in environmental disputes.
157 See Hundreds of Small Parties Released from Enforcement, supra note 155, at
2196-97.
158 See 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENvTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 55. The piloted streamlining techniques used at these
sites were as follows: "radio announcements, newspaper advertising, and toll free
telephone numbers ... ; conducting early interviews of parties to obtain information and
minimize the need for multiple rounds of information requests; and establishing a
publicly available repository for PRP Search information, to assist PRPs in identifying
other PRPs earlier in the enforcement process." Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See id.
539
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information and could lead "to the nomination of additional parties earlier in
the search process." 162
The search pilots provided the EPA with important conclusions about the
Superfund reforms. For example, by studying the results of these pilots, the
EPA realized that SRA notification time frames would not be feasible. In
addition, the EPA learned that "complex sites, troublesome hazardous
substances, and uncooperative PRPs" lead to the most obstacles in adherence
to the SRA time frames. 163
2. Expedited Settlement Pilots
In 1995, expedited settlement reforms were implemented "to reduce
transaction costs for all potentially responsible parties.., at Superfund sites
through early settlements."'1 64 These pilots were successful in bringing
parties to the table earlier in the cleanup process, resulting in early de
minimis settlements, ability to pay settlements with de minimis PRPs who
are unable to pay their full share, and the nomination of more PRPs earlier in
the process. 165
De minimis liability relief would provide "greater efficiency in allocating
responsibility under CERCLA" and "reduce some of the private party
litigation."'166 De minimis settlements will eliminate "parties that have
contributed very small amounts of pollution [or] are very small
themselves."'167 The benefits of early settlement with de minimis parties
include lower transaction costs due to a more efficient allocation of
162 Id.
163 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 59.
164 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 57.
165 See id. Expedited settlements first were proposed in section 408 of the SRA. See
S. 1068, 103d Cong. § 408 (1994). There Congress authorized and encouraged the
President to offer expedited settlements to the following three categories of PRPs: (1) de
minimis parties; (2) generators and transporters of municipal solid waste and sewage
sludge; and (3) small businesses or municipalities which have demonstrated a limited
ability to pay. See id.
16 6 Rhoads & Shogren, supra note 9, at 257. The 1998 Superfund Annual Report
recorded that the "EPA had settled with a total of 1,402 de minimis and ATP [ability to
pay] parties, resulting in the recovery of approximately $22.7 million." 1998 OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP.
50.
167 See Rhoads & Shogren, supra note 9, at 257.
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contribution shares and the creation of funds that can be used to encourage
other PRPs to settle.168
There are a variety of factors that the EPA acknowledged to have been
helpful to the success of expedited settlements. First, beginning work at the
sites early in the cleanup process will result in identification of and suitable
plans for the de minimis PRPs.169 Secondly, the region should concentrate on
gathering data about the history of the site and the "identity and contributions
of each PRP."'170 Lastly, it is valuable to help establish the basis for a de
minimis settlement with credible and accurate information on the costs of
likely future response actions. 171
3. The Allocation Pilots
While the SRA was never passed, the proposed allocation process
became the model for the EPA's ongoing "allocation pilot" program. 172
Under what can be called "an alternative dispute resolution technique based
on an arbitration-like process,"'173 the EPA plans to "reduce transaction costs
of liable parties and improve the efficiency and fairness of the system."174
Twelve sites were chosen in 1995 to implement the Allocation Pilots,
"offering a fundamentally different approach to allocating Superfund costs
between parties."'175 First, the parties select a neutral or "allocator" to
conduct a "non-binding out of court process resulting in an allocation report
where each allocation party is assigned a share of responsibility."'1 76 After the
"share of responsibility" is calculated, the parties may "offer to settle with
168 See id; see also 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 50.
169 See 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 50.
170 Id.
171 See id.
172 See id. at 52. These allocation procedures rely on those introduced in section 409
of the SRA. See id. at 48, 52; see also H.R. 4916, 103d Cong. § 409 (1994).
173 Rhoads & Shogren, supra note 9, at 256.
174 Superfund: Five Sites Chosen by Agency to Test Liability Allocation Based on
Reform Bill, 26 Envt. Rep. (BNA) 251,251 (May, 26, 1995).
175 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 58.
176 Id. Consistent with the SRA, the allocator will base the allocation upon the
following factors: the volume, toxicity, and -mobility of hazardous substances contributed
by each allocation party; each party's respective degree of involvement with disposal; the
degree of care exercised with respect to the hazardous substances; and the degree of
cooperation in contributing to the response action and providing information during the
allocation process. See id; see also 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY
RESPONSE, U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 48.
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the EPA based on their allocated share." 177 If there are allocation parties that
are now out of business and have no funds, the EPA will pay 100% of this
"orphan share." 178
a. The Nomination Process at Pilot Sites
The allocation pilot process gave PRPs the opportunity to suggest the
inclusion on the PRP list of any other parties "whose potential liability could
be justified by supporting documentation." 179 This was a valuable
opportunity for PRPs to identify additional allocation parties who could be
assigned shares by the allocator. 180 To discourage PRPs from making
frivolous nominations, the EPA tested a fee-shifting provision where a PRP
who nominated another PRP would pay the costs incurred by that party if the
nominee was assigned a zero share by the allocator.181
b. Selecting the Allocator and the Allocator's Role
To select the allocator, the parties interview candidates from the EPA's
pool and then reach "a consensus agreement on the best person for that site"
with the help of a neutral "convenor." 182 The EPA has solicited the
nomination of nongovernmental allocators to become a part of this pool. 183
By giving the parties discretion in choosing the allocator, this new allocation
process relieves the problem of participants perceiving the allocator as
177 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 58.
178 Id. An orphan share is a portion of cleanup costs that cannot be assessed to a
PRP as a result either of the PRP's insolvency or the EPA's inability to identify the PRP.
See id.
179 See 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 52.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 52, 54. The EPA reports that private parties were unhappy with fee-
shifting because the process was so burdensome; therefore, the nominating parties
withdrew the nominated parties that the EPA found not liable. See id at 54.
182 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 58.
183 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. The National Arbitration Association
also collaborates a list of members of the National Panel of Environmental Arbitrators.
See Kenneth P. Cohen, Allocation of Superfund Cleanup Costs Among Potentially
Responsible Parties: The Role of Binding Arbitration, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,158, 10,162 (May 1988).
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something other than entirely neutral. 184 If the parties trust the allocator as
neutral, they will be more likely to accept the allocation results. 185 The
parties are more likely to trust the allocator if the allocator is experienced
with arbitration in related areas.186 At most of the pilots, the parties were
interested in an allocator "who could act as both a mediator and allocator
because they believed there would be attempts to settle the matter before or
during the allocation." 187
The meetings with the allocator were beneficial to the parties because the
parties were able to participate in every stage of the process and remain
involved in decisionmaking. 188 This involvement gave the parties more
confidence in the allocator, resulting in more satisfaction with the outcome.
Some parties did complain that the allocators lacked important site-specific
information to create fair- allocations, but, for the most part, the use of
neutrals facilitates settlements and solves disputes between PRPs. 189
c. Need for Protocol Document
The allocation process should include key protocol, especially various
factors that may impact the transaction costs of allocation. 190 After analyzing
the pilot results, the EPA realized that a "basic confidentiality agreement"
and "litigation tolling agreement" alone were insufficient. 191 As evidenced
by the pilots, there is a definite need for protocol documents to contain
detailed procedures, including mandated time frames, to save time. 192
184 See Steven M. Jawetz, The Superfund Reform Act of 1994: Success or Failure Is
Within EPA's Sole Discretion, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,161, 10,168 (Apr.
1994).
185 See id.
186 See Cohen, supra note 183, at 10,162.
187 See 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 54-55. In this case the neutral would contribute
mediation skills during settlement and allocation skills later when issuing the allocation
report. See id.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See Rhoads & Shogren, supra note 9, at 257. Rhoads and Shogren suggest that
protocol documents should contain "factors such as the inclusion of a neutral, third-party
allocator, mandated time frames, and permissibility of nomination of PRP's [sic] by other
responsible parties." Id.
191 See 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 58. A litigation tolling agreement is necessary so that no
party will sue each other during the allocation process. See id.
192 See id.; see also Rhoads & Shogren, supra note 9, at 257.
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d. Results of the Allocation Pilot Program
As a result of the allocation pilots, the EPA has collected valuable
information about what improvements are necessary in order to streamline
superfund successfully in the future. The EPA found that at most of the sites,
settlement negotiations with the government were requested before the
allocation process was completed, providing earlier site cleanup and more
certainty as to the PRP's cost share. 193 There were consequences as well to
settlement negotiations during the allocation process. The allocation process
was put on hold in many cases, sometimes delaying reports for several
months, thus increasing transaction costs. 194
The results of the allocation pilot program have been mixed. "Several
parties thought the share assigned to them in settlement was fair considering
the level of information available, but others felt that their share was not fair,
believing that major corporations with greater resources were better able to
influence the allocator and/or the Agency."' 195 The process seemed more cost
effective for larger companies because the costs were less than litigation, but
small businesses found transaction costs to be high because they felt forced
to participate in order to protect their interests. 196 But, the general consensus
from the parties was that "flexibility in an allocation process must exist in
meeting deadlines.., to address site-specific conditions."'197
The EPA also has realized some important downfalls of the allocation
pilot program. For instance, the EPA found it hard "to translate a shares
agreement or allocation report into a judicial settlement"; thus, the consent
decrees at the sites had to be tailored individually to address each party's
interests. 198 It also was trying for the EPA to convert individual shares into a
workplan for the site because "parties only wanted to be responsible for their
individual share."'199 Since allocation schemes require 100% settlement
before the process can be completed, it is impossible to settle before there is
193 See 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 55.
194 See id. at 55-56.
19 5 See 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 59.
196 See id.
19 7 
Id.
198 Id. at 60.
199 1998 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY ANN. REP. 58.
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100% settlement.200 This lengthens the allocation process and impedes
cleanup. 201
Despite the downfalls mentioned above, the allocation does have some
distinct advantages. Most notably, settlements avoid litigation and are
expected to occur in a relatively short period of time and at a lower cost than
those settlements achieved under the current law.202 At the Tulalip Landfill
Site in Marysville, Washington, three Consent Decrees were signed with the
majority of the allocation parties at the Site.203 The Tulalip Landfill Site on
the Tulalip Indian Reservation is surrounded by three water bodies that flow
into northern Puget Sound.2°4 The Puget Sound is a federally designated
national estuary because salmon and shellfish flourish and threatened species
inhabit the Sound.205 The land was leased by the Tulalip Tribe to the Seattle
Disposal Company to store municipal, industrial, and hospital waste from
Seattle.206 In order to dispose of the waste, the former wetland was filled and
canals were used to barge in waste from Seattle.207 An inspection of the site
in February 1988 exposed elevated levels of heavy metals, volatiles,
semivolatiles, and PCB in the ground water and wetland water.208 The EPA
immediately was concerned by the level of toxins in the water because wells
within four miles of the site support almost 8,000 people. 20 9
The settlement at the Tulalip Site was completed quickly and with lower
costs. At Tulalip, "one group of parties ... perform[ed] the response action,
and two separate groups of parties... provide[d] funding for the cleanup." 210
The parties performing response action are using money from preallocation
de minimis settlements to fund cleanup, and this money reduces the settling
parties' respective responsibility.211
200 See id
201 See id.
202 See Rhoads & Shogren, supra note 9, at 257.
203 See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, NPL Site Narrative at Listing (visited Feb.
16,2000) <http:llwww.epa.gov/oerrpagelsuperfundlsites/npllnarl318.html>.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id From 1964-1979 almost 4 million cubic yards of waste were deposited at
the site. See id.
208 See id.
209 See id.
210 1997 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE & EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECrION AGENCY ANN. REP. 60.
211 See id.
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e. How to Increase Acceptance of Allocation Process?
One of the problems with acceptance of the allocation process is lack of
consensus regarding those factors that should be considered when allocating
costs. The allocation of response costs at Superfund sites is a "contentious
and unsettled" issue due to the lack of statutory direction on allocation.212
CERCLA fails to develop an approach for allocating this liability among the
various PRPs.213 However, it is known that allocation is equitable and that all
of the factors that are ignored at the liability phase are fair game as allocation
factors. 214 As explained above, PRPs may work together to craft an
allocation with or without a neutral allocator, or parties may take their
disputes to courts or arbitration. 215 Allocation of Superfund cleanup costs has
been assigned by statute to the courts, which "may allocate response costs
among the liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines
are appropriate." 216 But, this is as far as the statute goes, so courts and
allocators have been left to determine what equitable means and factors are
appropriate in developing equitable allocations of response costs.
This process is quite intensive and often fact- and site-specific. 217 The
Gore factors, a set of six factors delineated in the unsuccessful amendment to
CERCLA proposed by then-Representative Albert Gore, provide a starting
point for determining equitable factors. 218 The Gore factors are as follows:
(1) the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a
discharge, release, or disposal of hazardous waste can be distinguished; (2)
the amount of the hazardous waste involved;219 (3) the degree of toxicity of
2 12 Richard Lane White & John C. Butler III, Applying Cost Causation Principles in
Superfund Allocation Cases, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,067, 10,067 (Feb.
1998).
213 See id.
214 See id.
215 See id.
216 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§ 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(c)(1) (1994).
217 See White & Butler, supra note 212, at 10,070.
218 See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying
the Gore factors). A number of cases have applied these factors, including United States
v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568, 575 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Tyson, No. 84-
2663, 1989 WL 159256, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp.
1484, 1487 (D. Colo. 1985); and United States v. A&F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1256 (S.D. Ill. 1984). For a discussion of these factors, see John C. Butler III et al.,
Allocating Superfund Costs: Cleaning up the Controversy, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,133, 10,135 (Mar. 1993).
219 The volume of materials contributed to the site by each party is an important part
of allocating costs, but one must be aware that even "[a] small quantity of material may
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the hazardous waste involved;220 (4) the degree of involvement by the parties
in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the
hazardous waste; (5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect
to the hazardous waste concerned, taking into account the characteristics of
such hazardous waste; and (6) the degree of cooperation by the parties with
federal, state, or local officials to prevent any harm to the public health or the
environment.
As courts previously have noted, the Gore factors are not exhaustive,221
and courts have discretion to use whatever factors they want.222 For example,
as exemplified by the Allocation Pilots discussed above, criteria that
resemble the Gore factors have been proposed for use in this program.223 The
EPA used its discretion and has left out the first factor; therefore, parties'
ability to pay is not considered when determining allocation of costs in the
pilot program.224
The focus of allocation should be site-specific and party-specific issues
because allocation is a zero-sum game.225 Superfund practitioners need a
clearly articulated allocation principle in order to litigate an allocation case
successfully or to engage in a multiparty settlement process 226 A consensus
on allocation criteria will be helpful to parties involved in allocation
settlements and eventually will provide guidance to all parties, either in
settlement negotiations or litigation. The creation of a standard list of criteria
to consider in allocations may resolve some of the fairness issues that have
occurred in the Allocation Pilot Program.
have caused proportionately more damages than a larger quantity of a different material."
Cohen, supra note 183, at 10,158.
220 The "mobility, persistence, and other properties" of the material shall be
examined. Id.
221 See Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d 503, 509 (7th
Cir. 1992) ("The Gore factors are neither an exhaustive nor an exclusive list.").
222 See id. ("A court may consider several factors, a few factors, or only one
determining factor ... depending on the totality of circumstances presented to the
court.").
223 See supra, note 176 and accompanying text.
224 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
225 See White & Butler, supra note 212; see also LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL
WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 33-38 (1994). Zero-sum disputes are
those in which "one person's gain necessarily means an equivalent loss for the other side"
and in which "the gains and the losses of the bargainers exactly offset each other; that is,
they add up to zero." Id. at 33.
2 26 See David G. Mandelbaum, Toward a Superfund Cost Allocation Principle, 3
ENvTL. LAW. 117, 120 (1996). Mandelbaum discusses the need for cost allocation
guidelines in order for successful settlement negotiations.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The role of ADR between the government and responsible parties in
CERCLA settlements is evolving. SARA has paved the way for ambitious
environmental lawyers and policy makers to infiltrate alternative dispute
resolution into the realm of Superfund cleanup. There are thousands of
Superfund sites located across the United States that affect public health and
safety and threaten the health of our natural environment. It is necessary that
PRPs and the government begin to expedite the cleanup of these sites before
it is too late to protect the public and to protect valuable natural resources.
It seems obvious that those most affected by Superfund sites, the public
living near the sites, should be involved in the settlement process. By
involving the public in the actions taken at these sites, there will be less delay
and tension. If the public plays a role in the siting, use, and cleanup of
hazardous waste sites, there is more hope for compliance with environmental
regulations and therefore less controversy in the future. Environmental
disputes in the past have forgotten about those who have to breathe the air
and drink the water every day. The Superfund Reform Act of 1994 gave the
public an opportunity to participate in their own fate.
Even though this legislation did not pass, its central focus echoes in the
EPA's current strategy to improve Superfund. By emphasizing methods of
public participation and ADR, the new Superfund will provide parties with a
fairer allocation process and lower transaction costs. The public will have the
opportunity to provide more input into the entire Superfund process. In
addition, the government will have lower transaction costs, better compliance
rates from parties, and most importantly, better relationships with the public
and the parties. ADR helps the EPA develop more successful and ongoing
relationships with the public and the parties, thus developing a more
streamlined and efficient Superfund.
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